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RESPONSE TO CONTINENTAL'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brief of Appellee, p. 5 /• 3-7: Kingston represented to Christensen that the house he 
wished to insure was built in 1990, that it was a single family residence, and that he had 
prior insurance coverage on the home. R at 580. ... The Kingston dwelling was also not 
used as a single family residence. R. at 387-389. 
Christensen does not recall speaking with Kingston or preparing the application, and 
forgot he had given Kingston documentation proving he knew the house was built in the 
1800\s. (Fact 4] Continental's underwriting guidelines stated it would issue a single 
family residence policy on an owner-occupied home with 2 families. [Joint Brief of 
Appellants, Fact No. 11] Continental does not claim Kingston's home was used otherwise. 
There is no evidence anyone but Kingston's family lived in the home when the application 
was prepared. [Record generally] R. 580 does not mention prior insurance. The trial 
court granted Continental summary judgment only on the age of the house. Continental 
admits "the focus is solely on Kingston's [alleged] misrepresentation of the age of the 
home in the insurance application." [Brief of Appellee, p. 12] 
Brief of Appellee, p. 6 /. 2-4: Kingston and his wife admitted... the residence had been 
built so that three separate families could live at the residence. ... R. 388, 389. 
This statement is not supported by Continental's citation to the record, which states 
only that Joseph Kingston said that at an unidentified point in time the house had once 
"been divided into three different apartments." 
Brief of Appellee, p. 6 /. 6-7: During the demolition process, Kingston stopped the 
demolition work and Continental commenced an investigation into the loss. R. at 1408. 
The fire occurred on July 4, 1997, and Continental commenced its investigation on 
July 7, 1997. Demolition did not begin until August of 1997. [Facts 36, 37, 43] 
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Brief of Appellee, p. 6 /. 11-12: On March 13, 1998, Continental advised Kingston of 
its continued investigation ... under an express reservation of rights. R. at 2924. 
The last page in the record prior to the Notice of Appeal was 2879; the pre-appeal 
record does not extend to R. 2924. Since Continental filed its Complaint to rescind that 
same day as the alleged reservation of rights, this fact is irrelevant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CONTINENTAL WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO RESCIND. 
A. DUC Has Standing Litigate its Waiver Defense. 
Continental's argument that DUC lacks standing to litigate its waiver defense is 
without merit. A party has standing if he has a legally protectable interest in the 
controversy, InreM.W.. 2000 UT 79 112, 12 P.3d 80, if he has a personal stake in the 
outcome, Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145,1150 (Utah 1983). Continental's Second Cause 
of Action seeks a declaratory judgment as to the DUC's interest in the home and insurance 
proceeds. [R. 8] DUC's answer alleged an interest in the property and policy proceeds, 
and incorporated Kingston's defenses including waiver and estoppel. [R. 143, 173] DUC 
has an interest in the insurance proceeds unless Continental can rescind the policy. 
Continental cannot rescind the policy if it waived a right to rescind. The outcome of 
Continental's Second Cause of Action against DUC is directly affected by DUC's waiver 
defense, which gives DUC a legally protectable interest in the controversy and a personal 
stake in the outcome. Continental's Second Cause of Action against DUC gives DUC 
standing to litigate its waiver defense. 
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B. The Trial Court Erred in Denying DUC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Waiver. 
The trial court denied DUC summary judgment by stating DUC had set forth no facts 
showing Continental intended to relinquish its right to rescind. [R. 771J Continental and 
the trial court misunderstand the controlling law. When an insurer knowing facts giving 
it a right to rescind does any substantial act recognizing the policy as in force, such as the 
acceptance of a premium, the insurer's act is a waiver. Farrington v. Granite State Fire 
Ins. Co. of Portsmouth, 232 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1951). The insurer's act that treats the 
policy as in force is unequivocal evidence of the insurer's intent to waive. The insurer's 
act is the evidence of intent. Proving the act proves the intent. The trial court erred by 
failing to find Continental's acts of renewing Kingston's policy and accepting his premium 
payments was unequivocal evidence of Continental's intent to waive. 
C. Continental's "Weight of the Evidence" Argument Ignores the 
Standard on Summary Judgment and the Evidence in This Case. 
Continental's argument that the trial court's findings may not be reversed unless they 
are against the weight of the evidence is without merit. This action was decided on 
summary judgment, not by a trial. "A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in 
deciding a summary judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of 
material fact exists, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanpete 
County. 2002 UT 17 1 24, 42 P.3d 379. The trial court's rulings [R. 2034-43, 2552-55] 
give no indication the trial court even looked at the evidence of waiver, much less that it 
viewed the facts and reasonable inferences in a light favorable to Kingston and DUC. 
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D. There is Evidence that Continental Waived Any Right to Rescind. 
Continental's contention it did not learn of facts entitling it to rescind until January and 
March of 1998, and then acted with reasonable promptness to rescind, is not well taken. 
Continental moved for summary judgment based only on the home's age. Continental 
knew by July 11,1997 that the home was more than 100 years old. During July through 
October of 1997, Continental and its agents repeatedly went over the home with a fine-
tooth comb and became intimately familiar with its age, design, and structure' [Joint Brief 
of Appellants, Facts Nos. 36-54]. By treating the policy as in full force and effect during 
and after July-October 1997, Continental waived any right to rescind based on facts it had 
notice of as a result of examining the home in July-October 1997. 
Continental did not act with reasonable promptness to rescind. To rescind with 
reasonable promptness, an insurer must tender a return of premiums. "The law is well 
settled that one electing to rescind a contract must tender back to the other contracting 
party whatever property of value he has received." Perry v. Woodall. 438 P.2d 813, 815 
(Utah 1968). "An insurer asserting lack of coverage based upon misrepresentation must 
tender the premium when the defense is raised, or it loses the defense." Queen Citv 
Farms. Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha. 827 P.2d 1024, 1130 (Wash. 1992). 
Continental did not tender a return of any premiums. Instead, Continental kept all the 
premiums Kingston had paid from 1994 to 1997, and even after filing suit continued to 
1
 Although the trial court granted summary judgment based solely on the home's age, 
Continental's detailed examination of the home during July-October 1997 also necessarily 
gave Continental notice as to whether the home was a single-family dwelling. 
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pocket premiums Kingston paid from 1997 to 2003. Knowing the home's age and 
condition. Continental did more than just renew the policy and take Kingston's money. 
Continental told Kingston his loss was covered; paid his temporary living expenses; 
inspected the home and determined its condition and scope of damage; authorized and paid 
for demolition work; completed a scope of repairs to restore the home; solicited prices and 
obtained commitments from two contractors to do restoration, at a price set by 
Continental; authorized restoration at its own expense; and required Kingston to prepare 
an extensive personal property inventory to assess his personal property losses. 
Throughout, Continental did not indicate the age of the home was of the least concern. 
Continental's acts unequivocally evidence Continental's intent to waive any right to rescind 
based on the home's age. Continental had already waived its right to rescind based on the 
home's age by October of 1997, at least three months before Continental attempted any 
reservation of rights," which made its belated attempt to rescind ineffective. 
Continental argues it sent a January 9, 1998 "reservation of rights" letter2 and then 
examined Kingston under oath on January 19, 1998. At the end of that examination 
Continental told Kingston it was moving his claim forward, and was mainly awaiting 
documentation on Kingston's personal property losses. [R 1697] Continental's statement 
evidences waiver as of January 19, 1998. Even if Continental's March 13, 1998 letter and 
lawsuit reserved a right to rescind that existed that day, Continental waived any right to 
rescind after March 13, 1998. Continental not just once but repeatedly billed Kingston for 
2
 Continental cites this letter as being found at R. 2924. The last page of the record 
before the Notice of Appeal is R. 2879. 
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premiums, cashed his checks, and continued the policy in ftill force and effect. Continental 
not only tailed to tender a return of any premiums, it knowingly kept taking Kingston's 
money and renewing his policy, with a conscious intent and purpose to continue providing 
Kingston with insurance protection, not under a new policy, but under the same policy it 
issued in 1994. [Brief of Appellee p. 33] As Farrington states, Continental "cannot treat 
the policy as void for the purpose of defense to an action to recover for a loss thereafter 
occurring, and at the same time treat it as valid for the purpose of earning and collecting 
further premiums." When Continental treated Kingston's policy as valid and kept collecting 
further premiums, Continental waived any right to rescind the policy as a matter of law. 
This included a waiver of any previously asserted "reservation of rights." 
E. An Unwaived Right to Rescind Would Make the Policy Voidable, Not 
Void Ab Initio. 
A material misrepresentation in an insurance application merely makes the insurance 
policy voidable. Continental never argued to the trial court that the policy was void ab initio. 
Continental's First Cause of Action alleged it "is entitled to void the Policy," and asks for 
judgment that the policy "be voided" [R. 7, 10] Continental's Motion for Summary 
Judgment asked the trial court to "enter a finding that Kingston's policy may be rescinded..." 
[R. 1193] Continental's motion relied on U.C.A. § 31A-21-105(2) [R. 1183], which states 
only that a misrepresentation may affect the insurer's obligations under the policy. Continental 
also argued the language of Kingston's policy, which states, not that a misrepresentation would 
make the policy void, but only that Continental does not provide coverage to a covered person 
who misrepresented a material fact. Based on that language Continental argued it had "the 
6 
right to deny coverage." [R. 1191-1192] Continental raised this argument for the first time 
on appeal. Utah's appellate courts "will not address any new arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center. Inc.. 2003 UT 23 1 19, 70 
P.3d 904 (citing Treffv. Hinckley. 2001 UT 50, \ 9 n. 4, 26 P.3d 212). 
Subject to and without Appellants waiving the procedural defect in Continental's 
argument, Continental cites no authority for its argument. An insurer's reliance on an 
applicant's misrepresentation 3 only permits the insurer to void the policy at its election. 
Perkins v. Great-West Life Assur. Co.. 814 P.2d 1125. 1103 (Utah App. 1991). Aright 
to rescind would be for Continental's benefit alone, and can be waived. W.U. Tel. Co. 
v. Brown. 40 S.Ct. 460 (U.S. 1920). See Farrington. supra:4 
One who claims a right of rescission must act with reasonable promptness, and if 
after such knowledge, he does any substantial act which recognizes the contract 
as in force, such as the acceptance of the more than half of the premium would be, 
such an act would usually constitute a waiver of his right to rescind. In 25 
Am.Jur. 653, it is stated: fIt [the defendant company] cannot treat the policy as 
void for the purpose of defense to an action to recover for a loss thereafter 
occurring, and at the same time treat it as valid for the purpose of earning and 
collecting further premiums/ 
The equitable doctrines of waiver and estoppel apply to any contractual relationship 
regardless of context so long as warranted by the facts. Allen v. Prudential Prop. Cas. 
Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d 798, 806/A* 17 (Utah 1992). 
This assumes for the sake of argument there was a material misrepresentation. For 
reasons stated elsewhere in Appellants' briefs, there was no material misrepresentation. 
4
 Continental's attack on Farrington as dicta notwithstanding, Farrington correctly 
states the law. Continental does not challenge other legal authorities Kingston and DUC 
cite in support of this black-letter legal principle. [Joint Brief of Appellants, pages 29-30] 
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Continental's argument that estoppel and waiver cannot create coverage where none 
exists, and that no coverage existed because the policy was void, is not well taken. 
Continental made this argument for the first time on appeal. Utah's appellate courts "will 
not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal." Smith, supra. Subject 
to and without Appellants waiving the procedural defect in Continental's argument, 
Kingston's policy covered property damage from fire. [R. 1306, 1308] The question is 
whether Continental waived a right to rescind. Continental's own case, Sellers v. Allstate 
Ins. Co.. 82 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir. 1996), states "an insurer may be estopped by its 
conduct or its knowledge from insisting upon a forfeiture of a policy." As shown above, 
a right to rescind makes a contract merely voidable, not void, and is a right that can be 
waived. The undisputed facts show that, assuming Continental ever had a right to rescind, 
it waived that right as a matter of law. The trial court erred by ruling otherwise. 
II. CONTINENTAL IS ESTOPPED TO RESCIND. 
"DUC opposed Continental's renewed Motion for Summary Judgment by asserting the 
affirmative defense of estoppel." [Brief of Appellee p. 35-36] Continental did not argue 
against estoppel to the trial court [Record following R. 1710 generally], and raises its 
argument for the first time on appeal. Utah's appellate courts "will not address any new 
arguments raised for the first time on appeal." Smith, supra. Subject to and without 
Appellants waiving the procedural defect in Continental's argument, Continental challenges 
its estoppel by citing Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 407 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965) for 
8 
the proposition that a party is bound by the terms of his contract. Theros is not on point. 
It does not even mention estoppel or waiver, much less discuss the defenses. 
The equitable doctrines of waiver and estoppel apply to any contractual relationship 
regardless of context so long as warranted by the facts. Allen, supra. Continental does 
not challenge the evidence supporting Appellants' estoppel defense, which establish the 
elements of estoppel. [Joint Brief of Appellants pg. 33-35] 
Continental's argument that the trial court struck Kingston's affidavit is without merit. 
DUC, joined by Kingston, opposed Continental's Motion for Summary Judgment with its 
estoppel defense supported by a September 19, 2002 Affidavit of Joseph Kingston. [R. 
1699-17081 The trial court never struck that Affidavit, either sua sponte or pursuant to 
any party's motion. [Record following R. 1710 generally] 
Continental's argument that its post-loss acts do not show estoppel is without merit. 
Continental does not challenge the facts proving the elements of estoppel. Continental 
argues it did not promise "to extend coverage." This simply repeats Continental's 
argument that estoppel cannot create coverage where none exists. Since Kingston's 
insurance policy covered fire damage to property, the argument is not well taken. As 
discussed above, a right to rescind makes a contract voidable, not void, and an insurer may 
be estopped from rescinding. 
Kingston changed his position in detrimental reliance on Continental's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. Because Continental told Kingston it would pay for 
demolition, Kingston personally (not Continental) hired the demolition contractor, 
subjecting himself to personal liability. That Continental ultimately paid the cost does not 
9 
negate that Kingston changed his position in detrimental reliance on Continental's 
statements and acts, which satisfies that element of estoppel. 5 Kingston was buying the 
house from DUC under contract. Kingston could have surrendered his equity in the home 
and forfeited the contract. His continued payments for both the house and what he thought 
would be temporary housing was detrimental reliance on Continental's statements and acts, 
which again is all that element of estoppel requires. Continental admits paying Kingston's 
moving and living expenses (which entitles Kingston and DUC to judgment on the waiver 
issue) which is an admission of the first element of estoppel - Continental's act inconsistent 
with a claim for recision. Continental invoked a contract clause obligating Kingston to be 
examined under oath. Insisting on enforcing its right under the contract was an act by 
Continental inconsistent with claiming a right to rescind the contract, as was insisting on 
a contractual right to demand a proof of loss of Kingston's personal property. 
Continental's argument that Appellants did not allege estoppel as a claim for relief is 
not well taken. Estoppel is an affirmative defense. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 8(c). Kingston 
and DUC both alleged estoppel as affirmative defenses. 
The trial court was presented with evidence supporting all the elements of estoppel. 
Kingston and DUC ask this court to hold that the trial court committed reversible error by 
granting Continental summary judgment in the face of that evidence. 
Continental ultimately paid for the demolition work, knowing the home's age, 
without any reservation of rights. This fact alone is enough to grant Kingston and DUC 
judgment on the waiver issue. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING KINGSTON MADE A 
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION. 
A. Whether the Application's Stated Age of the Home Was a 
"Misrepresentation" Is a Question of Fact. 
Continental's contention that "it is undisputed that Kingston's ... application 
misrepresented the age of the structure by more than 100 years" [Brief of Appellee p. 12] 
is incorrect. "Misrepresentation" in this context is a term of art. An innocent misstatement 
is not a misrepresentation. [Joint Brief of Appellants pg. 21-23] Continental's argument 
that it had no reason to question the age of the home ignores the facts, which must be taken 
as true for summary judgment. Christensen was Continental's agent, so his knowledge is 
imputed to Continental. Kingston told Christensen the home was built in the 1800's. 
Christensen included that information in a computer printout he gave Kingston, proving 
Christensen knew the home's correct age. Christensen, not Kingston, put "1990" as the age 
of the home on Kingston's application. Kingston caught the error and brought it to 
Christensen's attention. Christensen explained in substance that it was proper to prepare the 
application by giving the year of the home's remodel as the home's age. Kingston relied on 
Christensen's explanation, giving the parties a mutual understanding as to that term. 
Christensen told Kingston Continental would inspect the home, so Kingston reasonably 
concluded Continental would learn the home's age, condition, and status from its own 
investigation. A jury could find from the evidence that the age of the home as stated in the 
application was an innocent misstatement. It was reversible error for the trial court on 
summary judgment to take that issue from the jury, weigh the evidence, or worse still ignore 
it. and to find a misrepresentation as a matter of law. 
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B. Whether the Age of the Home in the Application Was "Material" Is 
a Question of Fact. 
Continental urges this court to adopt a definition of "material" that ignores precedent. 
"Material" in this context is a term of art. Materiality is objective, not subjective as 
Continental argues. [Joint Brief of Appellants p. 24] Continental misconstrues Prudential 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mardanlou. 607 P.2d 291 (Utah 1980). Prudential left intact 
prior cases holding that "the materiality of a misstatement on an insurance application is a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury on the basis of an industry standard and not upon 
the insurer's assertion, made with the advantage of hindsight, that it would not have issued a 
policy had it known the truth." Id. at 293. The Prudential court did not adopt a new 
subjective standard. It only held that concealment of another insurer's cancellation of 
insurance for reasons other than nonpayment of premiums is material as a matter of law, 
making proof of the industry standard unnecessary. Id. After Prudential, the court in Hardy 
v. Prudential Ins. Co.. 763 P.2d 761, 769-70 (Utah 1988) affirmed that materiality is 
objective. Under Utah law, the test is "if reasonable insurers would regard the fact as one 
which substantially increases the chance that the risk insured against will happen and therefore 
would reject the application.'" The Tenth Circuit, and the Utah federal district court in a case 
decided after Continental's case Wisconsin Mtg. Assur. Corp- v. HMC Mtg. Corp.. 712 F. 
Supp. 878 (D. Utah 1989), also dealt directly with the issue, and have held materiality is 
objective. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Federal Ins. Co.. 983 F.2d 1549, 1555 (10th Cir. 
1993) {following Hardy). In Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Hughes. 784 F.Supp. 817, 821-822 (D. 
Utah 1992), the court also applied Utah law requiring an objective "industry standard" test: 
12 
[Tjhe materiality of a misstatement on an insurance application is a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury on the basis of an industry standard and not upon 
the insurer's assertion, made with the advantage of hindsight, that it would not 
have issued a policy had it known the truth. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. 
Co. v. Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted). The Utah 
Supreme Court has set forth the applicable test: 
| W|hether or not a misstatement in an application is material to the risk 
... depends not on what the insurer or the insured may think about the 
materiality or the importance of the false information given or the true 
information withheld, but upon what those engaged in the insurance 
business, acting reasonably and naturally in accordance with the usual 
practice among insurance companies in such circumstances, would have 
done had they known the truth; that is, whether reasonably careful and 
intelligent men would have regarded the facts as substantially increasing 
the chances of the happening of the event insured against so as to cause 
rejection of the application. 
... Accordingly, "materiality of the misrepresentation in this case [is] for the jury 
to determine on the basis of what a reasonable and prudent insurer would do in the 
industry." [citations omitted] ... This factual issue precludes summary judgment. 
Utah's industry standard was that an older home with recent upgrades to the roof, 
heating, electrical, and plumbing systems is insurable. A reasonable insurer would insure 
a home built in the 1800's with no obvious structural defects and recent upgrades to those 
systems. | R 1423 If 21, 1709 14] Under the objective test for materiality, a jury could find 
from the evidence that a reasonable insurer, knowing the true condition of Kingston's house, 
would have issued an insurance policy. [Joint Brief of Appellants, pg. 24-25] 
Even if a subjective standard applied, a jury could find from the evidence that 
Continental, knowing the true condition of the house, would still have insured it. Contrary 
to the after the fact self-serving statements of Continental's agents, Continental's 
underwriting guidelines allowed the writing of policies on homes like Kingston's. [Joint 
Brief of Appellants. Facts Nos. 11, 25, 26] Christensen testified in his deposition [R. 581]: 
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Q. Was it your understanding that Continental or CNA would not write a home 
built in the 1800's? 
A. I don't recall that. . . . 
Q. Did you have occasion to make contact with their underwriters? 
A. Yes, occasionally. They were pretty loose. CNA was buying a lot of 
business. They wanted the business. We didn't have to take photos or even 
inspect the homes. 
Q. Do you recall what their policy was relative to homes built in the 1800's, at 
the time you took mis application? 
A. I don't ever remember seeing CNA not write a home. 
Protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, Continental did in fact insure older homes, 
including homes built in the 1800's. [Joint Brief of Appellants Fact No. 31] Even 
Continental's Brief of Appellee at page 19 admits Continental would insure older homes 
under some circumstances. 
The evidence in this case does not permit the trial court to find Kingston made a 
material misrepresentation as a matter of law. The statement of me home's age in 
Kingston's application either was not "material" as a matter of law, or is a fact question 
for the jury. In either case, it was reversible error for the trial court to find a material 
misrepresentation as a matter of law. 
IV. CHRISTENSEN WAS CONTINENTAL'S AGENT. 
Continental's argument that Christensen was not Continental's agent is not well taken. 
Kingston and DUC both alleged in their pleadings that Christensen was Continental's agent. 
[R. 141, 144, 149-150, 1083, 1087-89] Christensen testified he had authority to bind 
Continental, at least temporarily. [R. 577] In opposing Continental's final Motions for 
Summary Judgment, DUC argued Christensen was Continental's agent. [R. 1420113,1431, 
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1437, 1800 1 17, 1803-1807] Continental did not challenge those arguments. The closest 
Continental came to addressing the issue was in opposing DUC's Motion to Revise Orders. 
DUC again argued Christensen was Continental's agent. [R. 1861 1 1] In opposition, 
Continental adopted Christensen's response, which did not deny the agency relationship, but 
(incorrectly) argued the issue of agency had not been raised. [R. 1942, 1959] Continental 
raised the argument that Christensen was Kingston's agent for the first time on appeal. 
[Record generally] Utah's appellate courts "will not address any new arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal." Smith, supra. Therefore, this court should reject Continental's 
argument that Christensen was Kingston's agent and not Continental's. 
Subject to and without Appellants waiving the procedural defect in Continental's 
argument, Christensen's status as Continental's agent is relevant because "the policy 
justification for permitting rescission centers on the applicant's knowledge of an 
undisclosed condition, i.e., the insurer is entitled to know what the applicant knows, but 
cannot reasonably expect to know more by relying only on the applicant." Derbidge v. 
Mutual Protective Ins. Co.. 963 P.2d 788, 794 (Utah App. 1998). Because an entity can 
act only through its agents, In re Ewles' Estate. 143 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 1943), the 
knowledge of Continental's agents is imputed to Continental: 
Under longstanding Utah law, "the knowledge of [an] agent concerning the 
business which he is transacting for his principal is to be imputed to his principal." 
... This rule is broad, encompassing " 'all notice or knowledge relating to the 
subject-matter of the agency which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as 
such agent and within the scope of his authority.' "[A] principal is affected with 
constructive knowledge, regardless of his actual knowledge, of all material facts 
of which his agent receives notice or acquires knowledge while acting in the 
course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, although the agent 
does not in fact inform his principal thereof." 
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Wardlev Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon 2002 UT 99116, 61 P.3d 1009 (citations 
omitted). Further, U.C.A. § 31A-23-305(l) (1986), in effect when Christensen prepared 
Kingston's application, provided, "There is a rebuttable presumption that every insurer is 
bound by any act of its agent performed in this state that is within the scope of the agent's 
actual (express or implied) or apparent authority ..." Continental is bound by the acts of 
Christensen, and information Kingston provided Christensen is imputed to Continental. 
[Joint Brief of Appellants p. 7-9, 34-36] 
Neither Van der Hevde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 845 P.2d 275 (Utah App.1993) 
nor Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York. 761 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1988) stand for the 
proposition for which Continental cites them. In Van der Hevde. the insurer assumed the 
soliciting agent was the insurer's agent. Id. at 280yh 8. The case does not even mention 
the word "broker," much less discuss it. Vina applied former U.C.A. § 31-17-1, defining 
an agent as "any person authorized by an insurer and on its behalf to solicit applications for 
insurance ...", and § 31-17-2, defining a broker as "any person who, on behalf of the 
insured ... solicits, negotiates, or procures insurance ... A broker is not an agent... of an 
insurer and does not have power, by his own act, to bind the insurers upon any risk or with 
reference to any contract." In Vina, a broker contacted an insurer for whom he was not an 
agent, because the insurance companies for whom he was an agent did not write the kind of 
policy the insureds wanted. Id. at 584. In this case, Christensen was a licensed agent for 
Continental, solicited insurance applications for Continental, and had power by his own act 
to bind Continental. Under these facts, Christensen was Continental's agent. 
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V. CONTINENTAL HAD A DUTY TO MAKE A REASONABLE 
INVESTIGATION OF READILY AVAILABLE FACTS. 
Continental' argument notwithstanding, State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Wood. 
483 P.2d 892 (Utah 1971) holds that an insurer has a duty to make a reasonable 
investigation of insurability within a reasonable time after accepting an application. 
Continental's attempt to distinguish the case is not well taken. While it is true that 
automobile liability insurance protects the public as well as the insured, homeowner's 
liability insurance also protects both the public and the insured. Kingston's policy included 
both automobile and homeowner's liability coverage. [R. 1287 et seq.] 
There is no logical basis to apply the duty of reasonable investigation recognized in 
State Farm to automobile liability insurance but not homeowner's liability insurance. 
Other jurisdictions have found a duty of reasonable inquiry extends to home inspections. 
See Nathan v. St. Paul Mut. Ins. Co.. 68 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1955): 
We agree with the reasoning of Insurance Co. v. Leslie, 41 Ohio St. 409, 24 N.E. 
1072, and conclude that the nature, use, and condition of a structure which 
reasonably are discoverable by an inspection at the time the fire insurance policy 
is issued or renewed cannot be shown by the insurer as proof that, relative to those 
matters, the insured committed intentional fraud or misrepresentations increasing 
the risk of loss. And failure to inspect shall not put the insurer in any better 
position than if an inspection had been made. 
Continental's argument that an applicant could escape all liability for 
misrepresentations rests on a misunderstanding of the duty. An insurer only has a duty 
to make a "reasonable investigation," not a "complete independent investigation." Under 
State Farm a reasonable investigation at least includes an effort to check readily available 
public records. Id. at 429. It is reasonable for an insurer to check public records such as 
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the county recorder or assessor, or make at least a cursory inspection as Nathan requires, 
either of which would have disclosed that Kingston's home was built in the 1800's. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING KINGSTON'S AND 
DUC'S COUNTERCLAIMS. 
Christensen was Continental's agent. Point IV supra. Except for arguing without 
support that Christensen was not Continental's agent, Continental did not oppose 
Kingston's and DUC's appeal of the dismissal of their Counterclaims for misrepresentation 
against Continental. [Joint Brief of Appellants pg. 35-37] Therefore, this court should 
reverse the dismissal of Kingston's and DUC's Counterclaims. 
VII. WENTZEL'S AND CHRISTENSEN'S TESTIMONY WAS INADMISSIBLE. 
Continental does not challenge Appellants' argument that Kathleen Wentzel's 
testimony was inadmissible under Utah R. Evidence 602. Continental now argues Wentzel's 
testimony was admissible as expert opinion testimony under Utah R. Evidence 703. 
Continental made this argument, as well as the arguments in its footnote 14, for the first time 
on appeal. Utah's appellate courts "will not address any new arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal." Smith, supra. On the merits, Continental designated Wentzel as a fact 
witness, [R. 1487-88], and did not attempt to qualify her as an expert witness. 
Continental argues that Christensen's testimony was admissible under Utah R. Evidence 
406. Continental made this argument for the first time on appeal. Utah's appellate courts 
"will not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal." Smith, supra. 
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CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the above, D. U. Company and Joseph Kingston respectfully ask this Court 
to reverse the trial court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of Continental, to 
reverse the trial court's order denying summary judgment in favor of DUC and Kingston, 
and to remand this action to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment 
in favor of DUC and Kingston on the grounds that, based on the undisputed facts, 
Continental waived any right to rescind as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, DUC and Kingston ask this court to reverse the trial court's orders 
granting summary judgment in favor of Continental on the grounds there are genuine 
issues of fact relating to DUC's and Kingston's defenses and counterclaims, reverse the 
trial court's orders denying DUC's motion to strike the affidavit of Kathleen Wentzel and 
portions of the deposition of Brent Christensen, reverse the trial court's order granting 
costs to Continental, and remand this action for trial. 
DATED October 18, 2004. 
Attorney for ^VtfT Company, Inc. Attorney for Joseph Kingston 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on October 18, 2004 two copies of the above were served by first class mail to: 
Stephen J. Trayner 
H. Scott Jacobson 
STRONG & HANNI 
Nine Exchange Place 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Continental Insurance Company 
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